- 2020 Martin Wolf [Coronavirus crisis lays bare the risks of financial leverage, again](https://knowen-production.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/attachment/file/4358/Coronavirus%2Bcrisis%2Blays%2Bbare%2Bthe%2Brisks%2Bof%2Bfinancial%2Bleverage_%2Bagain%2B_%2BFinancial%2BTimes.pdf)

> **This time it is capital markets, rather than banks, that have to reform**
>  the late Hyman Minsky taught us: debt causes fragility
 
>  This will reinforce “heads, I win; tails, you lose” strategies. So vast is the size of
> central bank and government rescues that moral hazard must be pervasive.

> I think of this as trying to run capitalism with the least possible riskbearing capital. It makes little sense. This creates a microeconomic task — eliminating
> incentives for the private sector to fund itself so heavily via debt; and a
> macroeconomic one — reducing reliance on debt to generate aggregate demand

- [CRASHED - Adam Tooze](https://www.piie.com/system/files/documents/toozer2018-10-30ppt.pdf)

see p 18
**A history of 2008 and its aftermath captures a moment in a paradigm shift**

Crisis forces us to reconsider relationship between:

> Real and monetary economy
> National and international
> Macro and Micro
> Geography of globalization
> **Where power lies in the dollar based global financial system**

- [Globalisation: real and financial](https://www.bis.org/speeches/sp170625b_slides.pdf)  Hyun Song Shin

**not separable Globalisation**



- [Debt and Deleveraging](https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Featured%20Insights/Employment%20and%20Growth/Debt%20and%20deleveraging/MGI_Debt_and_deleveraging_executive_summary.ashx) McKinsey


- [Three Sudden Stops and a Surge]()

**Reflections on the Global Financial Crisis, through the lens of the U.S. balance of payments**.
Blog Post by Brad W. Setser

> The first sudden stop, of course, came in the summer of 2007. Foreign demand for U.S. corporate bonds had absolutely soared in 2005, 2006

> The fall in bank flows came a bit later than the fall in corporate bond flows. But it was equally brutal

> There was a third sudden stop: demand for Agencies dried up in the summer of 2008. 

> **And the weakest link in the chain was the ability and willingness of private investors to take credit risk**, not the ability and willingness of foreign central banks to add to their dollar holdings.